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ABSTRACT
This paper describes ongoing research investigating perceptual and contextual influences on
skilled human performance in dynamic decision-making environments. The research is motivated
by two general classes of findings in recent decision-making research. First, many studies suggest
that the concrete context in which a task is presented has strong influences on the psychological
processes used to perform the task and in subsequent performance. Second, studies of skilled
behavior in a wide variety of task environments typically implicate the perceptual system as an
important contributor to decision-making performance, either in its role as a mediator between the
current decision context and stored knowledge, or as a mechanism capable of directly initiating
activity through the development of a "trained eye." Both contextual and perceptual influences
place limits on the ability of traditional utility-theoretic accounts of decision-making to guide
display design, as variance in behavior due either to contextual factors or the development of
perceptual skill is left unexplained. We outline a framework in which to view questions of
perceptual and contextual influences on behavior and describe an experimental task and analysis
technique which will be used to diagnose the possible role of perception in skilled decision-making
performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Two major themes run through much recent research on human decision-making. First, the
psychological processes engaged when performing a given task appear to be strongly affected by
the particular concrete context in which the task is presented [5,8]. Humans seem to be relatively
insensitive to the formal, or deep structure of a task and tend to be strongly influenced by the
problem content and contextual features of information display. Seemingly minor changes in
wording or graphical display often have major consequences on resulting human behavior.
Abstract problem representations (in psychology as in any science), are intended for wide range of
reference and they achieve this goal by necessarily dispensing with problem content and context in
favor of preserving deep structural invariance. That psychological processes may not respect such
deep invariances should perhaps not come as a surprise, if we consider the dimensions along
which tasks are distributed for a typical human decision-maker or problem solver. Rarely are
people asked to solve a large number of problems with similar deep structure but variable content
or context. Rather, the skilled decision-maker (e.g., a pilot or process control operator) works in a
world of problems of similar content, presented within a fixed context, but with widely varying
deep structure. There would seem to be little motivation for such a skilled performer to develop
and use solution methods with greater range of reference than his or her own task environment.
This line of reasoning lends itself to interpreting a second major set of findings on human
decision-making, in this case concerning skilled performance and the development of expertise. In
a large number of task domains, such as chess [1], naturalististic decision-making [6], and X-ray
diagnosis [7], expert performance appears to rely heavily upon an immediate perceptual evaluation
of the decision situation. The expert chess player reduces the cognitive demands of elaborate
search, the naturalistic decision-maker reduces the cognitive demands of enumeration and
comparative evaluation of decision alternatives, and the X-ray diagnostician reduces the cognitive
demands of Bayesian reasoning, all by virtue of some form of immediate perceptual processing of
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the problem state. The mechanisms underlying these abilities are not well understood, but it is
typically hypothesized that extensive experience has enabled the decision-maker to quickly match
the current situation to one that has been seen in the past, and to thereby retrieve, rather than
calculate, an appropriate action to be taken. Here, perception is responsible for the pattern
recognition function that encodes the situation in terms of features highly relevant to the task, to
enable the activation of "chunks," "schemas," or "cases," in long-term memory.
These studies once again stress the primacy of the concrete decision context, as opposed to the
abstract problem structure, in determining the psychological processes engaged in task
performance. Regardless of whether a decision problem might be best formally characterized in
terms of a search tree, decision tree, or through Bayesian evidential reasoning, with experience
human performance appears to gravitate toward a heavy reliance upon a perceptual or recognitional
mode of processing, presumably strongly determined by the perceptible information available. In
addition, there is reason to believe that humans will perform tasks in this mode when highly
skilled, despite the fact that a more formal approach to the decision task might be required to
achieve optimal performance. If this is the case, human-machine system designers should attempt
to ensure that the displayed information format fosters this mode of processing and allows it to
function productively, rather than encourages a more analytical, but perhaps incompatible, decision
strategy [4,6]. At a minimum, displays should probably be designed with this goal in mind for the
many cases in which the decision problem is too complex to be attacked by formal methods or
when the decision situation is characterized by unforseen contingencies.
Unfortunately, very little in the way of specific guidance is available to the designer of
information displays due to our current lack of knowledge of perceptual or recognitional decision
processes. One factor that makes skilled decision processes difficult to empirically identify is the
power of utility-based decision processes to mimic performance produced by processes quite
different those assumed by utility theory. If human decision behavior approaches optimality, a
normative model of performance will be able to successfully mimic that performance since it
indicates the optimal performance level. Such a model, though, only indicates that behavior has
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been shaped to meet task demands, and it offers little insight into the nature of the processes
responsible for behavior. While this feature makes normative models valuable for certain
prediction purposes [2], descriptively valid models of skilled decision-making are nevertheless
required to aid system design. As Fischoff [2] has noted, for design purposes modeling "must
focus on the concrete stimuli observed by operators and consider the real problems of observing,
interpreting, and integrating them." (p. 279)
Our goal in this study to to attempt to diagnose and describe the possible use of a perceptual
decision process in a dynamic decision-making task. Although the research discussed above has
focused primarily on the pattern recognition function perception might perform to allow current and
stored situations to be associated, here we do not assume that declarative memory is implicated in
every perceptual decision process. The decision processes which are the focus of the current
research take the form of perceptual heuristics than can be used for action selection without the
need for matching presented and represented items in memory. To give an example, it appears
that people use two simple perceptual heuristics (as opposed to some other form of reasoning) to
judge the relative mass of two objects involved in a collision [3]. People appear to make mass
judgements by assuming that faster moving objects are less massive, and that objects that ricochet
backward are less massive than the object it hit. This is a case in which the identification of the
perceived information used appears to provide a sufficient account of the judgement process
without assuming that stored memory for collision events are consulted in the decision process.
The perceptual heuristics considered here have this nature.
DIAGNOSING A PERCEPTUAL DECISION PROCESS
it,
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As with the perceptual heuristics for judging masses mentioned above, we hypothesize that
skilled decision-makers sometimes use perceptual heuristics to obviate the need for elaborate
reasoning. The method we propose for empirically identifying these heuristics takes advantage of
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the fact that, as heuristics, these processes will fail to produce optimal performance in certain
decision situations. Any given display format for a decision task makes available a number of
dimensions of information that can serve as the basis for a perceptual heuristic. Each dimension of
displayed information, though, may be only conditionally diagnostic of the appropriate action to be
taken. That is, a heuristic based on a given dimension will produce correct performance in some
sub-region of the decision problem space, and sub-optimal performance in the remaining region.
Given knowledge of the task constraints and payoff structure, it is possible to identify a number of
possible perceptual heuristics that could be used to perform the task and associate with each an
"error signature" that allows use of the heuristic to be inferred from the empirical data. These ideas
will be made more precise with reference to a specific laboratory task.
The experimental task is a variant of a dynamic decision-making task originally developed by
Tulga and Sheridan [9]. It should be made clear that we have made a number of changes to the
task dynamics and interface in order to create an instrument that can be used to diagnose perceptual
decision processes. As a result of these changes, our treatment of human performance is intended
to be restricted in scope to the current version of the task only. Any extrapolations of our findings
to other research using variants of this task must be made with extreme care.
The display, shown in Figure 1, shows four horizontal lines, At the start of each trial, four
rectangles of variable height and width appear at the left side of the screen and begin to move to the
right. Each rectangle represents a task that must be processed before it reaches its due-date (the
end of the line). In the present version of the task, subjects processed a rectangle by pressing a
numbered key. The keys were vertically arranged on a modified keyboard to ensure spatial
compatibiIity with the display. In general, the subject's task is to determine an appropriate order in
which to process the four rectangles and to enter the order as rapidly as possible.
Only one rectangle can be processed at a time. If the subject enters the keys 1,2,3,4 in that
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order, rectangle 1 will begin processing and the other rectangles will travel some variable distance
across the screen during the time in which rectangle 1 is being processed. After the first rectangle
has completed processing, the next rectangle will begin processing, and so on, until all the
rectangles have disappeared from the screen. The subject cannot interrupt the ongoing processing
of a rectangle, and may make keypresses at any time after the initiation of the trial, although a
performance penalty is incurred if the subject delays between keypresses. As an inducement to
rapidly determine an ordering of the rectangles, any time delay incurred between entering
successive keys is reflected in a delay of the same duration between the end of the first rectangle's
processing and the start of the second rectangle's processing. This feature of the task was included
specifically to promote the development of rapid, possibly perceptual decision processes.
During intervals in which a rectangle is being processed, or in which processing is delayed, the
remaining rectangles move across the screen at variable speeds. The speed with which a rectangle
moves has been constrained to vary linearly with its area. Larger (area) rectangles move
proportionately slower than smaller rectangles.
The optimal ordering is a function of a number of factors. First, the nominal value of a
rectangle is indicated by its height. In calculating the actual payoff earned by processing a
rectangle, though, the nominal value is divided by the distance the rectangle has traveled when it
has completed processing. Therefore, a higher proportion of a rectangle's nominal value is earned
the shorter the distance it has traveled. The overall payoff for a single trial is the sum of the payoffs
earned for the four rectangles. Subjects are given the payoff information in qualitative form prior
to the experiment, and receive a score at the end of each trial, indicating the percent of optimal
performance that was achieved.
Calculating Error Si_atures
The purpose of the following analysis is to identify a number of possible perceptual heuristics
that could be used to order the four rectangles and to identify, for each heuristic, an expected
v pattern of errors. The method used is to identify an optimal ordering rule and to assess the degree
to Which various perceptible dimensions of information could serve as a basis for a perceptual
heuristic to be used in lieu of the optimal rule. The maximum possible payoff (P) for each of the
24 (4!) possible orderings of the four rectangles in a single trial can be expressed as a function of
the rectangle heights (/-/) and widths (w) as follows:
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In this equation, i andj are indices indicating the order in which the rectangles are processed (i =j
=1 is the first rectangle processed, and so on). The term in brackets indicates how the delays
associated with processing rectangles previous to rectangle i (rectangles indexed by j) contribute to
lowering the attainable payoff for rectangle i, as less payoff can be earned since the rectangle will
have moved across the screen. This factor indicating how attainable payoff for a rectangle is
reduced by processing previous rectangles can be expressed solely in terms of the widths
(processing times) of the rectangles.
We hypothesize that a perceptual decision process for performing this task will consist of
ordering the four rectangles by reference to a single dimension of information on the display.
Rectangle heights, widths, areas, shapes (height/width) are all dimensions that could be used to
perceptually determine an ordering. There is no reason to believe that ordering the four rectangles
by any single dimension will yield optimal performance in all trials. Since the ordering of any two
rectangles a and b would be independent of the features of the remaining two rectangles under such
a heuristic strategy, we can simply consider the degree to which the different dimensions can be
used to determine optimal pairwise comparisons of rectangles. For the case of two rectangles,
then, rectangle a should be processed prior to rectangle b if: (from the equation above)
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Isolating features of individual rectangles, rectangle a should be processed prior to rectangle b if:
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Unfo_unately, this optimal pairwise ordering rule would require a comparison of rectangle features
that do not seem to be readily perceptibly measurable. But while the squared height divided by the
width of a rectangle does not appear to be perceptually accessible, the shapes (height divided by
width) and heights alone do appear to be readily accessible to perception and mimic the optimal
palrwise ordering rule to some extent. Ordering two rectangles by shape or height will, for many
pairs of rectangles, result in agreement with the optimal rule, but will result in a ordering reversal
for other pairs.
Diagnosing perceptual heuristics involving the displayed dimensions of height, shape, or any
other dimension requires an identification of the sub-regions of the decision problem space in
which use of these heuristics would result in optimal and sub-optimal performance. Figure 2
indicates the 16 rectangles that are used in the present experiment plotted in log(width) X
log(height) space. Consider a pair of such rectangles of the form (7,X). The line of slope i/2
through rectangle 7 partitions the space into those rectangles that should be ordered prior to
rectangle 7 (those above the line), and those that should be ordered after rectangle 7, according to
the optimal pairwise rule derived above. (The line of slope 1/2 is a graphical representation of the
optimal pairwise rule derived above). The line of slope 1 through rectangle 7 partitions the space
in a similar way, although this line is a graphical representation of the perceptual heuristic that
orders rectangles based on shape (height/width). As can be seen from the figure, the shape
heuristic mimics the optimal pairwise rule for a majority of rectangle pairs, but fails in some others
(e.g., the pair (7,15). In general, the shape perceptual heuristic will fail for all pairs of the form
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(i,i+8) in the diagram. This region of the problem space determines the error signature that would
be expected by use of the shape heuristic. Similarly, an error signature for the height heuristic
(horizontal line) can be determined.
DISCUSSION
At the time of this writing we are conducting experiments using the methodology described
above. Therefore, the hypotheses concerning perceptual decision processes discussed above
remain tentative. Whether or not we are on the right track with the present approach, we do believe
that a relatively finely grained analysis of both behavior and task environment such as the one
discussed above are necessary in order to understand skilled performance. One complicating factor
that makes these hypotheses difficult to test is the presence of what might be called "artifactual
dimensions" of displayed information. In addition to dimensions such as rectangle height and
width that have been explicitly designed to communicate meaningful information to the subject,
many other contextual dimensions are also present as artifacts of the format chosen for the display.
Shape is just one such artifactual dimension present on the experimental display. A real world
example of an artifactual dimension might be the pattern produced by pointers on a set of analog
cockpit displays. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that crews attend to these patterns, and a
move to digital state display based on a desire to improve access to individual state variable values
might have the unintended and unfortunate consequence of removing this artifactual information
source. We suspect that use of such sources might be relatively common in skilled performance.
An example well known to the behavioral scientist is the clever subject who is able to defeat the
most elegantly designed laboratory task by finding some "trick" associated with use of an
artifactual information source (the whir of a disk drive or an aberration in the graphics software).
The method proposed above will also hopefully allow us to address the issue of how perceptual
decision skills are acquired. Both the salience and diagnosticity of dimensions of information
Um
could be expected to influence which perceptual heuristics might be developed. It might be
reasonable to assume that experience at a task has the function of moving the decision-maker from
using dimensions of high initial salience but perhaps low diagnosticity, to dimensions of perhaps
lower initial salience but higher diagosticity. In addition, we intend to explore how the proposed
analysis might be extended to more complex task environments, in which one of a number of
hierarchically organized perceptual heuristics could be variously selected by a differentiation of the
decision problem space into classes of problems of specified types.
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Experimental Display at Trial Initiation
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Figure 2. Decision Problem Space
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Designing interfaces to promote effective human decision-making requires
knowledge of the psychological processes underlying skilled behavior so that
information display formats can be designed to promote the development of high-
level skill. Recent research suggests that skilled decision-makers often rely on
perceptually intensive processes quite unlike those assumed by highly
enumerative utility-theoretic decision models. What often appears to distinguish
the expert from the novice is a "trained eye" for relevant information rather than
the possession of elaborate decision-making procedures. Neural network
modeling approaches are receiving increasing, attention as candidate descriptions
of perceptually-oriented decision processes since human decision behavior may
gravitate toward a pattern recognition processing mode through experience. This
paper discusses the suitability of neural networks as descriptions of skilled
decision-making behavior, and provides a number of constraints on their design
for the purpose of achieving psychologically adequate models. One major
constraint concerns the specification of a psychologically appropriate input
feature representation, and this issue is articulated through a discussion of an
experimental study of skilled human behavior in a graphically displayed dynamic
decision-making task. This experiment allowed the dimensions of graphical
information used by human subjects to be identified, and therefore provides
empirically motivated constraints on the design of neural network models of
skilled decision behavior.
INTRODUCTION
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Researchers and practitioners in human-machine systems engineering have
long been interested in the problem of designing information displays to promote
effective human decision-making. Candidate display formats are always
motivated by the designer's theories of the psychological processes operative in
human decision-making, regardless of whether these theories are explicitly
formalized in a model or whether these theories consist only of implicitly held
unformalized assumptions. To a large extent, the effectiveness of a display-based
decision aid will be determined by the degree to which the psychological
assumptions motivating the display design are consistent with the decision
processes employed by the display user. To date, research on display design for
decision support has almost exclusively relied upon a utility-theoretic
characterization of the processes underlying decision and choice behavior. Utility
theory (von Neumann and Morgernstern 1947) portrays the decision maker as
exhaustively enumerating the set of decision alternatives or actions, estimating
the probabilities of various outcomes resulting from each action, comparitively
evaluating these outcomes with respect to a utility function, and finally selecting
a desired action on the basis of some type of maximization operation.
Within this perspective, questions of display design for decision support
concern the appropriate presentation of action attributes, probabilistic outcomes,
and other information related to the use of the utility theoretic decision-making
procedure. For aiding an experienced decision-maker, though, such design
guidelines will be productive only to the extent that a utility-theoretic decision
procedure is actually being employed by the expert decision-maker. In novel
applications, these guidelines will only be effective if display designs motivated by
utility theory promote the acquisition of high-level skill through experience.
Findings from the past forty years of empirical research on human decision
behavior have necessitated a gradual retreat from the view that human decision-
makers always behave as utility maximizers in the sense originally portrayed by
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utility theory. As a result, there is real concern that displays effective for
supporting a utility-based decision process may provide little support for the
processes skilled decision-makers actually use. To the extent that the
psychological processes underlying skilled decision behavior are unlike utility-
based operations, these utility-based display designs may even inhibit the
development of high-level skill. As will be discussed below, it appears to be the
case that the utility theoretic model may well describe decision behavior only at
low and intermediate stages of skill development in a given problem domain,
where high levels of skill are better described by perceptually and/or
recognitionally-based processes that do not appear to rely upon the highly
enumerative calculations presumed by utility theory. If this is the case,
knowledge of these alternative decision processes is required to support the design
of displays that are consistent with the acquisition and operation of the decision
strategies characteristic of high-level skill. This paper is concerned with
assessing the potential of neural network models to provide a suitable account of
skilled decision processes to support the design of display formats compatible with
skilled performance.
w
PERCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF SKILLED DECISION-MAKING
Simon (1959) observed that human information processing limitations will
often prohibit a person from fully implementing a utility-theoretic decision
process. Instead, Simon proposed that a person in a decision situation of realistic
complexity will satisfice rather than optimize, in that the decision-maker will
attempt to achieve an acceptable rather than optimal solution to a decision
problem. The principle of satisficing may have been the first break from the
extreme view of human decision-making as utility maximization, but it was by no
means the last. In recent years a number of behavioral scientists have found that
human decision behavior departs from normative standards in a variety of ways
(e.g., see Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) and Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982)),
and in response theories of decision-making have been proposed that relax more
and more of the the strict assumptions of utility theory. For example, Kahneman
and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory not only relaxes the assumption that human
ww
estimation of probabilities will be veridical, but it also provides a framing stage
that allows contextual aspects of a decision problem to influence decision
behavior, although these contextual features have no representation in the
normative utility-theoretic model.
More recently, a number of researchers studying skilled decision behavior in
environments of high complexity have documented an additional set of
inadequacies of the utility-based approach. Unlike the research referenced above
that maintains the overall picture of decision-making as (albeit imperfect) option
enumeration, evaluation and selection, these new findings suggest a radically
different account of the processes underlying skilled behavior. Klein's (1989)
studies of skilled decision-making in naturalistic contexts has led him to propose
that highly experienced decision-makers rarely undergo a comparative
evaluation process while making decisions, but rather select a promising action
based on a rapid perceptual assessment of the decision environment. In both the
combinatorially complex game of chess (Chase and Simon 1973) and the
challenging task of X-ray diagnosis (Lesgold et al. 1988), highly experienced
experts appear to rely upon a rapid perceptual evaluation of the decision situation
as the basis for action selection.
w
Such skills are often thought to rely upon the activation of memories for
previous decision problems, and in this case perception is presumed to be
responsible for the pattern recognition function that allows current and stored
experiences to be associated. This recognitional as opposed to purely perceptual
view, however, has only limited empirical support (but see Logan 1988), for it is
not yet known whether the ability to summon memories for previous encounters
is a critical component of skilled decision-making behavior. Our own previous
research on skilled performance using graphically displays, for example, is.
based on the view that skilled decision behavior can be generated by a tuning of
the perceptual system to highly relevant features of the environment to allow the
direct perceptual selection of action without the need to assume memories are
consulted in the decision-making process, in the tasks of route planning (Kirlik,
Miller and Jagacinski 1988), supervisory control (Kirlik, Miller and Jagacinski
1989), and dynamic decision-making (Kirlik, Markert and Shively 1990). In the
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following, we shall be concerned mainly with skilled decision processes of this
purely perceptual, rather than the more complex perceptual + recognitional,
type.
A NEURAL NETWORK ALTERNATIVE
The possibility that skilled decision behavior is heavily reliant upon a
perceptually intensive evaluation of the environment suggests that neural
network models may have the potential to model the acquisition and production of
decision-making skills. One central reason that neural network models may be
attractive in this respect is that they appear to offer a candidate description of how
an expert may develop a "trained eye" through experience at a decision task, and
how this capability might obviate the need for a more cognitively elaborate
decision process to achieve successful performance. The ability of adaptive
networks to become attuned to the most highly diagnostic features of a decision
problem may shed some light on the principles of perceptual development
underlying the acquisition of expertise, and may therefore be illuminating as to
the way in which information displays should be designed to promote skill
acquisition and skilled decision-making performance.
UnfortunateIy, there is still much work to be done before it can be determined
whether neural network models can provide an empirically adequate model of
human decision-making skills. As Pavel, Gluck and Henkle (1988) have noted,
most current neural network architectures and learning techniques are simply
too unconstrained to mimic human learning and psychologically appropriate
constraints are not yet known. In that work, for example, the authors
investigated adding a minimal congfiguration constraint to a standard three-
layer network in an attempt to mimic human generalization behavior,
hypothesizing that a network with a minimal number of hidden units would
produce a psychologically adequate model. The minimal configuration constraint
did not produce adequate generalization behavior, however, and the authors have
suggested exploring an additional set of constraints dealing with initial
conditions of connection weights.
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We believe that an identification of important constraints on network design
can proceed most efficiently by detailed empirical investigations of the aquisition
and use of skilled human decision processes. Thus, we advocate a primarily
bottom-up modeling orientation that will hopefully avoid many false starts in
proposing perhaps elegant, yet psychologically irrelevant, modeling architectures
and learning rules. Other, more top-down approaches may certainly be more
appropriate for achieving engineering solutions to various tasks, but the demands
of information display design in human-machine systems requires a model that
faithfully represents the nature of the processing activities underlying skilled
human behavior. In this spirit, we present below a discussion of some issues that
must be considered in constructing an empirically adequate neural network
model of perceptually-oriented decision processes.
Input Feature Representations
One primary motivation for considering a neural network modeling approach
is to address the issue of how an expert decision-maker may become attuned to
the most highly diagnostic dimensions of information in a given task
environment. As Dawes and Corrigan (1974) have noted, experts in a particular
decision environment seem to be much better at selecting and coding the relevant
input variables, or features, than they are at integrating feature information after
it has been selected. This empirical phenomenon is one major reason that simple
linear regression models are typically quite successful in out-performing even
expert decision-making behavior (Goldberg 1968; Johnson 1988). These simple
models perform so well at various judgemental tasks (e.g., medical and
psychological diagnosis) because considerable human expertise has gone into
selecting the independent variables that are relevant to the decision problem.
After the relevant features have been selected, it may not be surprising that these
models achieve better performance than human experts since they combine
information in an optimal (i.e., least squares) fashion, whereas human abilities
to perform information integration are quite limited (Dawes, 1979).
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Since much of the responsibility for human decision-making expertise may be
due to this feature selection capability, it is highly desirable to understand the
psychological constraints that determine which input features will be attended to
by the human expert. From a modeling perspective, this issue is directly related
to the problem of specifying the primitive input feature representation used for
environmental description. The reason that the choice of environmental
description is so critical is that the mere act of describing the environment
strongly constrains the possible behaviors that a model using such a description
can exhibit, and also partially determines the information integration activites
necessary to perform any classification task. Any environmental features that
are equivalently classed, or else abstracted away entirely in the environmental
description are rendered incapable of producing behavioral variance. On the
other hand, the environmental description may be too finely rather than too
coarsely grained (with respect to the input features used by the human), with the
result that significant amounts of information integration might be necessary to
reconstruct within the model what are actually primitive environmental features
from the perspective of the human expert. The danger here is that the model will
suggest that a good deal of possibly cognitive-level information integration is
required to obtain supposedly "high-order" features, whereas the human expert
may be actually perceptually detecting a high-order environmental feature
directly.
The problem of environmental representation is by no means new, but it is
especially critical for the purpose of psychological modeling with neural
networks. For example, Pao (1989) has noted that innappropriate choices for a
network's primitive feature representation can lead to the need for very complex
decision or categorization rules, wheras incisive choices can lead to much
simpler decision rules to perform the same decision task. Schuurmans and
Schaeffer (1989) have made a similar point in the context of developing classsifier
system models based on genetic algorithms, where they note that the selection of
primitive input features for such models has the potential to either create or avoid
a combinatorial explosion in the search for rules during the learning process.
The ability of Tesauro and Sejnowski's (1989) neural network to successfully learn
to play the game of backgammon was highly dependent on the choice of input
features used by human experts in that domain (e.g., "slotting" and "stripping").
As the arguments above suggest, much of the "intelligence" involved in skilled
performance may be in the selection of these features for primitive environmental
representation, rather than in the way they are internally processed, and
therefore the fact that one must already be a domain expert to construct a
successful learning model (Tesauro 1989; Schuurmans and Schaeffer 1989)
severely compromises the ability of such approaches to provide psychological
insights into the nature of the development of expertise.
Input representation problems are particularly acute when considering
human decision-making behavior in the context of a graphical information
format, such as on a situation or map display (Kirlik 1989). In map displays, for
exampIe, it may be the case that supposedIy high-order reIations among map
features are actually more easily perceptually available than are the first-order
features themselves. Consider the simple problem of attempting to determine a
path for a vehicle between two waypoints on a map. If, say, distance and direction
between the waypoints are important information sources, note that a Cartesian
representation of the map display space will require that information integration
be performed to obtain these "high-order" features from the first-order features
(the coodinates of the waypoints), most likely using the properties of the right
triangle. If, on the other hand, a polar representation of the display space was
used (with origin at the point of foveation), the distance and direction between two
waypoints could be obtained directly by foveating at one waypoint and simply
reading the (radius, angle) coordinates of the other waypoint directly from the
environmental representation. Note how the choice of primitive feature
representation for the map display strongly determinines the complexity of the
processes that would be needed to model skilled human performance in this task,
and it could be argued that the potential benefits of graphical displays as decision-
aids cannot be understood until appropriate display representations are found.
In a later section of this paper, we will discuss some empirical and analytical
approaches we are currently using in order to better understand the constraints
on input feature selection by human experts, in the hope that a principled
approach to input feature representation for decision-making tasks will be
forthcoming.
Feature Salience
Even supposing a psychologically adequate environmental representation can
be specified, it is quite likely that that the salience of various input features
strongly influences the dimensions of information used by a human decision-
maker in a particular task environment. For example, Gilden and Proffitt (1989)
have demonstrated the importance of information salience in the processes
underlying human judgments about simple physical events. Through training,
neural networks have the capability of detecting the diagnosticity of an input
feature for performing a particular task, but there is no simple provision allowing
networks to be sensitive the the different degreesof psychological salience that
various dimensions of input information may possess. In Kirlik, Markert and
ShiveIy (1990) we advanced the hypothesis that through experience a human
decision-maker may move from using dimensions of high initial salience but
perhaps low diagnosticity, to the use of dimensions with high diagnosticity but
perhaps low initial salience. Initially, then, we suggest that decision-makers
may be biased to use dimensions of information that are easy to perceptually
measure, even though these dimensions may not be highly informative. Only
through experience may a human decision-maker learn to attend to dimensions
of information of very low initial salience if these dimensions are highly
informative. In a later section we describe experimental work underway to
assessthe validity of these hypotheses.
The problem of describing sensivity to salience places two constraints on the
design of a psychologically plausible neural network model. First, provisions
must be made to explicitly represent salience, either in the environmental
representation or in the model. Although it is normal to speak of salience as a
property of environmental information, the fact that the salience of a dimension of
information may change through experience with the development of perceptual
sensitivity suggests that salience might best be described as a dynamic property of
the perceptual response. What is suggested, then, is that to appropriately achieve
attention allocation to various input features these features must be described not
only by their currently perceived diagnosticity (as reflected by connection weights
eminating from the feature nodes), but also by their current perceptual salience.
A second constraint on network design concerning salience is the specification of
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mechanisms for the dynamic updating of salience values, as these values are
changed through the development of perceptual sensitivity. As a large
component in information display design is the manipuation of information
salience (e.g., though color, blinking, etc.), models of display-aided decision
processes must produce behavioral variance to salience so that they can be used
in a predictive process of display evaluation.
The End Product of
Finally, we note that since a skilled decision-maker's ability to select diagnostic
dimensions of information is probably superior to his or her ability to integrate
information from multiple sources, it is quite likely that humans may have a
tendency to use relatively few of the potentially large number of available sources
of information present in a given environment. Provided that a small number of
dimensions of information can be used to obtain acceptable (but perhaps
suboptimal) performance, the decision-maker may indeed process only a
relatively small set of the information available in order to make a decision. It
has been demonstrated, for example, that increasing the amount of information
available to a decision-maker may increase the decision-maker's confidence in
his or her judgements, but it may not increase the accuracy of those judgements
(Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971).
These observations suggest that psychologically appropriate neural network
models must be constrained to use only a relatively small subset of the available
input features when fully trained. The optimal solution of a given decision
problem may indeed require attention to a large number of input features, but
redundancy among input feature values and/or low diagnosticity values of certain
features may be exploited to allow reasonable decision accuracy with attention to a
much smaller set of input features. As will be described below, we are exploring
the use of the networkskeletonization process described by Mozer and Smolensky
(1989) as a potential method of pruning the set of input features to which a neural
network model will attend at asymptotic performance.
w- . AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH
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We are currently using an empirical approach to identify constraints on
appropriate models of skilled decision-making behavior. The laboratory task
described below is being used to investigate the hypothesis that skilled decision-
makers sometimes use perceptual decision processes as heuristics to obviate the
need for elaborate reasoning. From a modeling perspective, our interest is in the
potential of neural networks to mimic the rate and nature of the aquisition of
these perceptual decision processes. The method are using to empirically identify
these decision processes takes advantage of the fact that as heuristics these
perceptual processes will fail to produce optimal performance in certain decision
situations. The pattern of errors generated by human subjects can therefore be
examined to infer the nature of the perceptual heuristics used, and can therefore
determine to which dimensions of information these decision-makers attended
during skilled performance. Identifying the nature of information used by these
decision-makers provides a rich source of constraint on the design of appropriate
neural network models for mimicking human learning and skilled decision-
making behavior.
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Laboratory Task
The experimental task is a variant of a dynamic decision-making task
originally developed by Tulga and Sheridan (1980). A brief description of the task
is given below and a more extended treatment can be found in Kirlik, Markert
and Shively (1990). The display, shown in Figure 1, shows four horizontal lines,
At the start of each trial, four rectangles of variable height and width appear ate
keys 1,2,3,4 in that order, rectangle 1 will begin processing and the other
rectangles will travel some variable distance across the screen during the time in
which rectangle 1 is being processed. After the first rectangle has completed
processing, the next rectangle will begin processing, and so on, until all the
rectangles have disappeared from the screen. The subject cannot interrupt the
ongoing processing of a rectangle, and may make keypresses at any time after the
initiation of the trial, although a performance penalty is incurred if the subject
n
Dm
w
w
.im
delays between keypresses. As an inducement to rapidly determine an ordering
of the rectangles, any time delay incurred between entering successive keys is
reflected in a delay of the same duration between the end of the first rectangle's
processing and the start of the second rectangle's processing. This feature of the
task was included specifically to promote the development of rapid, possibly
perceptual decision processes.
During intervals in which a rectangle is being processed, or in which
processing is delayed, the remaining rectangles move across the screen at
variable speeds. The speed with which a rectangle moves has been constrained to
vary linearly with its area. Larger (area) rectangles move proportionately slower
than smaller rectangles. The task is somewhat complex as the optimal ordering
of the four rectangles is a function of a number of factors. First, the nominal
value of a rectangle is indicated by its height. In calculating the actual payoff
earned by processing a rectangle, though, the nominal value is divided by the
distance the rectangle has traveled when it has completed processing. Therefore,
a higher proportion of a rectangle's nominal value is earned the shorter the
distance it has traveled. The overall payoff for a single trial is the sum of the
payoffs earned for the four rectangles. Subjects are given the payoff information
in qualitative form prior to the experiment, and receive a score at the end of each
trial, indicating the percent of optimal performance that was achieved. Each
experimental session consisted of a series of 80 trials, and subjects were run for a
total of ten sessions over a ten day period.
Calculating Error Signatures
The purpose of the following analysis is to identify a number of possible
perceptual heuristics that could be used to order the four rectangles and to
identify, for each heuristic, an expected pattern of errors. The method used is to
identify an optimal ordering rule and to assess the degree to which various
perceptible dimensions of information could serve as a basis for a perceptual
heuristic to be used in lieu of the optimal rule. The maximum possible payoff (P)
for each of the 24 (4!) possible orderings of the four rectangles in a single trial can
be expressed as a function of the rectangle heights (H) and widths (w) as follows:
W
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In this equation, i and j are indices indicating the order in which the rectangles
are processed (i =j =1 is the first rectangle processed, and so on). The term in
brackets indicates how the delays associated with processing rectangles previous
to rectangle i (rectangles indexed by j) contribute to lowering the attainable payoff
for rectangle i, as less payoff can be earned since the rectangle will have moved
across the screen. This factor indicating how attainable payoff for a rectangle is
reduced by processing previous rectangles can be expressed solely in terms of the
widths (processing times) of the rectangles.
We hypothesize that a perceptual decision process for performing this task will
consist of ordering the four rectangles by reference to a single dimension of
information on the display. Rectangle heights, widths, areas, shapes
(height/width) are all dimensions that could be used to perceptually determine an
ordering. There is no reason to believe that ordering the four rectangles by any
single dimension will yield optimal performance in all trials. Since the ordering
of any two rectangles a and b would be independent of the features of the
remaining two rectangles under such a heuristic strategy, we can simply
consider the degree to which the different dimensions can be used to determine
optimal pairwise comparisons of rectangles. For the case of two rectangles, then,
rectangle a should be processed prior to rectangle b if: (from the equation above)
Wa
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Isolating features of individual rectangles, rectangle a should be processed prior
to rectangle b if:
Wa Wb
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Unfortunately, this optimal pairwise ordering rule would require a comparison of
rectangle features that do not seem to be readily perceptibly measurable. But
while the squared height divided by the width of a rectangle does not appear to be
perceptually accessible, the shapes (height divided by width) and heights alone do
appear to be readily accessible to perception and mimic the optimal pairwise
ordering rule to some extent. Ordering two rectangles by shape or height will, for
many pairs of rectangles, result in agreement with the optimal rule, but will
result in a ordering reversal for other pairs.
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Diagnosing perceptual heuristics involving the displayed dimensions of height,
shape, or any other dimension requires an identification of the sub-regions of the
decision problem space in which use of these heuristics would result in optimal
and sub-optimal performance. Figure 2 indicates the 16 rectangles that are used
in the present experiment plotted in log(width) X log(height) space. Consider a
pair of such rectangles of the form (7,X) in the figure. The line of slope 1/2
through rectangle 7 partitions the space into those rectangles that should be
ordered prior to rectangle 7 (those above the line), and those that should be
ordered after rectangle 7, according to the optimal pairwise rule derived above.
(The line of slope 1/2 is a graphical representation of the optimal pairwise rule
derived above). The line of slope 1 through rectangle 7 partitions the space in a
similar way, although this line is a graphical representation of the perceptual
heuristic that orders rectangles based on shape (height/width). As can be seen
from the figure, the shape heuristic mimics the optimal pairwise rule for a
majority of rectangle pairs, but fails in some others (e.g., the pair (7,15). In
general, the shape perceptual heuristic will fail for all pairs of the form (i,i+8) in
the diagram. This region of the problem space determines the error signature
that would be expected by use of the shape heuristic. Similarly, an error
signature for the height heuristic (horizontal line) can be determined.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
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Note that with this analysis of the decision problem space, the use of each
possible perceptual heuristic can potentially be inferred from the data produced by
each laboratory subject. In this way, this analysis helps us identify the nature of
the information used by subjects as they acquire decision skills in this task: with
the result that certain constraints on appropriate neural network model design
can be empirically determined. A minimal necessary condition for a neural
network model of human behavior in this task is that it learns to use the same
dimensions of displayed information as do subjects, and the methdology described
above will allow us to validate our models with respect to this critical constraint.
Preliminary Results
We are currently performing detailed analysis of data produced by five subjects
using the methodology described above. At this point, it appears that the behavior
of two of the five subjects is well described as the stable use of a single dimension
of displayed information for ordering the four rectangles over the last five
sessions of training. The error profile produced by one subject is highly similar to
the error signature predicted by examination of the height-ordering perceptual
heuristic, while the error profile generated by another subject is highly similar to
the error signature expected through use of the area-ordering heuristic. The
other three subjects appeared to have used a mixture of the possible heuristics, or
else a heuristic based on a dimension of perceptual information not yet identified.
Rigorous statistical tests of these conclusions, as well as detailed analyses of the
other three subjects are not available at this time.
One interesting observation that can be made even from the preliminary
results of this experiment is the use of what might be called "artifactual
dimensions" of graphically displayed information. One subject appeared to order
the rectangles by a simple perceptual comparison of the areas of the four
rectangles. It is important to note that the laboratory display was not
intentionally designed to communicate any meaningful task information by the
dimension of rectangle area. Rather, this information source is an artifact of
display design, as it might not have been present if a different display format had
been used. Rectangle shape is another such artifactual information source
present on the display, and our results appear to suggest that subjects may learn
to use such artifactual information sources if these sources are perceptually
salient and somewhat diagnostic, even though they were not explicitly designed to
communicate useful information. We suspect that this phenomenon is not
restricted to this laboratory task environment, as in many casesgraphical
displays make perceptually salient high-order relations among task variables,
and although the potential benefit of such relational information may not be
predicted by the display designer, it may nevertheless be discovered by the highly
skilled display user.
CONSTR.4JNTS ON NEURAL NET MODELS
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The previous discussion of modeling constraints motivated by a review of the
literature, combined with the emerging results of our own experimental work,
suggest a number of constraints on the design of a psychologically adequate
neural network model of learning and performance in this laboratory task. We
suggest that the following constraints may also be applicable to modeling skilled
decision-making processes in other perceptually rich (i.e., non-verbal) problem
domains.
Relational Input Features
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Input features must be determined by a finely grained examination of the
perceptually available displayed information. What may be thought to be high-
order relational features may actually be primitive single input features from the
standpoint of perceptual sensitivity. In the present experiment, rectangle area,
for example, may be just as easily measurable as rectangle height and width, and
it should therefore be included in the input feature set used by a neural net model.
See also Gluck, Bower and Hee (1989) for a demonstration of the use of of
configural input features in neural net modeling.
Artifactual Input Features
E Simply because various dimensions of graphically displayed information have
not been intentionally designed to communicate meaningful information does not
mean that these dimensions will always be ignored by display users. For
modeling a decision-maker in a given task domain, one cannot use a utility-
theoretic model, for example, to exhaustively determine network input features,
since many other dimensions of information are likelyto be available but have no
representation in the constructs of the utility-based model. If other than utility-
based processes are being used, other than utility-based information is likely to be
used.
Input Feature Salience
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Subjects in our experimental task had available a dimension of information
that could have led to optimal pairwise orderings of rectangles, although this
dimension of information was not initially salient and could therefore probably
not be used. At Ieast one, and perhaps more, subjects appeared to reIy upon
rectangle height, which is a very salient dimension of information although not
perfectly diagnostic. We suggest that variance in human behavior will be
generated as a function of both salience and diagnosticity, although to our
knowledge salience has not been well represented in neural network models to
this point. Due to the problems involved in attempting to measure salience, we
expect this constraint on neural network modeling to present challenges for a
long time to come.
Dynamic Feature Salience
The skilled decision-maker may develop perceptual sensitivity to dimensions of
information of very low initial salience (e.g., as in wine tasting, chess, and music
appreciation). Although the duration of training and/or the abstract nature of the
information display in the present experiment may not provide for the
development of perceptual sensitivity in this task, provisions for dynamic
Lmeasures of input feature salience are likely to be necessary for modeling skilled
decision-making in naturalistic contexts.
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Size of Attended Feature Set
A skilled human decision-maker may only attend to a relatively small subset of
the information available in a given task environment. We are currently
exploring the skeletonization technique developed by Mozer and Smolensky to
prune lowly diagnostic nodes from input and hidden layers, focusing the network
on the most highly diagnostic information. Without focusing techniques such as
this, the nature of many standard learning rules such as back propogation may
distribute significant connection weight values widely thoughout a network, as
there is no constraint on such learning rules that would trade off processing
complexity for small losses in decision accuracy, as might human decision-
makers.
CONCLUSIONS
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Based on a review of a variety of findings in decision-making research and our
own laboratory work in progress we have presented a number of constraints on
the design of psychologically plausible neural network models of skilled decision
behavior. Naturally, a large number of other (e.g., physiological) constraints
might be suggested as well, but those outlined above capture what we believe to be
many critical aspects of skilled human decision-making. Whether or not we are
on the right track with the present approach, we feel that appropriately
constrained neural networks might provide an opportunity for describing
perceptual aspects of skilled decision behavior, and might provide an important
tool for the design of displays to promote the acquistion of decision-making skills.
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Figure 1. Experimental display at trial initiation
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Figure 2. Decision problem space showing the 16 rectangles used as stimuli.
The line of slope 1/2 is the optimal pairwise ordering rule. Various perceptual
heuristics are shown by the other lines, each based on a different dimension
of graphically displayed information. See text for explanation.
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